The Criminal Protection of Women's Right to Life against Honor Killings under Qatari Law: A Comparative Study

Abstract

This study examines the effectiveness of the criminal protection afforded to women's right to life against so-called honor killings under the Qatari Penal Code, in comparison with Egyptian and Jordanian law and with the provisions of Islamic Sharia. The study adopts a descriptive, analytical and comparative approach based on the relevant legislative provisions, judicial rulings and criminal-law doctrine.

The study finds that, despite the differing standards used to define honor, the concept remains governed by customs and traditions that vary from one society to another, and that the honor at stake in honor killings is not confined to women's chastity, while most existing definitions of this crime remain limited to specific scenarios. The position of Islamic Sharia is clear in prohibiting all forms of honor killing; it waives Qisas (retribution) only where a married woman is caught in the act of adultery and evidence thereof is duly established, while the perpetrator may still receive a discretionary (Ta'zir) punishment.

Since the right to life is recognized in numerous international instruments ratified by the State of Qatar, the Qatari Penal Code protects this right by criminalizing all forms of assault on life. Under Qatari law, an honor killing constitutes premeditated murder with all its elements, even though its motive differs from that of ordinary premeditated murder; this difference may influence the judge's assessment of the perpetrator's dangerousness, although Qatari law attaches no legal significance to motive. Grounds for negating or diminishing criminal responsibility, such as lack of discernment or of perception, may arise in some cases; however, the perpetrator cannot invoke necessity or loss of free will, as these do not apply to honor killings. Moreover, general deterrence is undermined by the possibility of mitigating the penalty through statutory excuses, such as pardon by the victim's next of kin (Wali al-Dam) or acceptance of blood money (Diya), through mitigating circumstances applied at the judge's discretion, or through an Emiri pardon or commutation of the penalty. Although the Qatari legislator rightly refrained from following comparative Arab laws in codifying the scenario of surprising a spouse in the act of adultery as a mitigating excuse, that scenario remains subject to judicial discretion under the provisions of Islamic Sharia to which the Penal Code refers in Hudud and Qisas crimes. The study concludes by recommending the adoption of an independent criminalizing provision for honor killings, and the restriction of judicial discretion in mitigating their penalty by requiring reasoned judgments.